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Abstract 
 
This article examines the Hong Kong mass poisoning of 15 January 1857, in which bread from a 
Chinese bakery that supplied the colonial community was adulterated with arsenic. Even 
though there is a wealth of printed and manuscript documentation available many vital aspects 
of the poisoning remain unclear. What kind of incident was it: an act of terrorism and 
attempted mass murder, a war crime, a criminal conspiracy, an act of commercial sabotage, an 
accident or even an imagined or imaginary event? Throughout, our focus remains firmly fixed 
on the central act of the poisoning itself and on what it reveals about the precarious nature of 
early colonial Hong Kong. Interpretations have swarmed over the available ‘facts'. Equally ironic 
is what happened to the afterlife of how the event was understood. This article seeks to rescue 
the Hong Kong poisoning from being a freakish and isolated footnote of only local interest. 
Accepting this historical verdict would be a mistake as it is of significance not only at a local 
level, but geopolitically in Britain and across the empire. 
 
Introduction 
 
The Hong Kong mass poisoning of 15 January 1857, in which bread from a Chinese 
bakery that supplied the colonial community was adulterated with arsenic, was a unique event 
in terms of its potentially devastating consequences, unparalleled not only in the history of 
Hong Kong but also in the British Empire. Our investigation focuses on why it is so difficult to 
classify this poisoning incident. What kind of incident was it: an act of terrorism and attempted 
mass murder, a war crime, a criminal conspiracy, an act of commercial sabotage, an accident, or 
even an imagined or imaginary event? We are interested primarily in the colonial and imperial 
dimensions of this case so the views of Hong Kong’s Chinese community are not represented 
here. Even though there is a wealth of printed and manuscript documentation available – a 
published but incomplete transcript of the trial, Colonial Office records, Hong Kong and English 
newspapers and magazines, parliamentary reports, and several contemporary or near 
contemporary short memoirs and exchanges of letters still unpublished or in manuscript in 
England or the United States – many vital aspects of the poisoning remain unclear. For example, 
it is not known who added the poison to the bread, or on whose orders it was done. One 
technique used here to counteract or neutralise these conundra has been to attempt to 
separate certainty from probability or possibility, to divide what is definitely known to have 
happened from what probably or may have happened. Another technique has been to dig deep 
into the context of key elements of the poisoning, some of them unfamiliar, across a range of 
geopolitical and local issues. In geopolitical terms, the key elements are the usual ones. The 
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background to the poisoning is supplied by the resumption of hostilities between China and the 
recently established British colony, and by new legislation introduced into Hong Kong taking 
this war footing into account, that particularly affected the Chinese residents. In local terms, in 
the colony, attention is centred on rather different topics to the usual ones: on the availability 
of arsenic, the state of bread-making, and the character, contacts and social position of the 
prime suspect, the baker, Cheong Alum. For the final section, the investigation moves to how 
and why there were attempts in Britain to deny that the poisoning had ever taken place. 
Throughout, the focus remains firmly fixed on the central act of the poisoning itself, and on 
what it reveals about the precarious nature of early colonial Hong Kong.    
In this Hong Kong narrative, there are a number of definite ‘facts’. On the morning of 15 
January 1857 all the residents of the colony who ate bread from the Esing bakery on Queen’s 
Road1 owned by Cheong Alum suffered in varying degrees from nausea, vomiting, intense 
stomach pain, dizziness and general malaise. One witness estimated the number of victims at 
300-400, and another at 400-500. There was also a military garrison numbering c. 1,000 in Hong 
Kong, but Esing’s bread did not reach the troops in time for their early breakfast.2 There was no 
immediate death as a result of the bread poisoning. In the course of the morning various 
medical practitioners and government officials (including the Governor, Sir John Bowring) 
suspected foul play in the form of poison. Tests conducted in the ensuing days and months in 
laboratories in Hong Kong by Dr. Harland3 (in conjunction with four other local doctors: 
Bradford, Kenny, Watson and Dempster),4 in England by the official War Office chemist, F. A. 
Abel,5 and in Germany by Justus von Liebig,6 all concurred that the bread contained large 
quantities of white arsenic.  
Esing’s shop was open at least by 6.30 am (but probably much earlier). Cheong Alum, his 
father, his wife, his children and a couple of servants left Hong Kong for Macau on the 
Shamrock at 8 am that morning. The family group was detained that evening, and brought back 
to the colony the following morning.  By the evening of 16 January, fifty-two Chinese men 
(including Alum and his father) who worked at the bakery and shop had been arrested in 
connection with the poisoning. Governor Bowring insisted on the rule of law, declaring that 
Cheong Alum and his accomplices must be tried by jury, rather than subjected to a ‘drum-head 
court martial’, as preferred by Attorney General, Chisholm Anstey, and the majority of the 
colonists.7 
By 19 January ten Chinese men (including Cheong Alum and his father) had been 
committed for trial at the Supreme Court. On the 21 January, a preliminary interrogation took 
place at the Central Police Station (represented here in a drawing published in The Illustrated 
London News [Fig. 1]). The remainder of the detainees were remanded under Ordinance no. 2 
of 1857 and were confined in a fifteen foot square, twelve foot high cell at Cross Roads police 
station at the bottom of Wellington Street. Several were deported on 26 January and 3 
February. The poisoning case at the Criminal Sessions lasted from Monday 2 February until 
Friday 6 February; it was the longest criminal trial so far in Hong Kong’s history as a colony. 
Under the title ‘The Queen versus the Poisoners’, the ten defendants stood accused of  
‘administering poison with intent to kill and murder James Caroll Dempster, Colonial Surgeon’. 
On 6 February the six-man jury retired for fifty minutes before returning a five-to-one verdict of 
‘not guilty’. The defendants were re-detained immediately as being ‘suspicious characters’ 
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under the Peace and Security Ordinance No. 2 of 1857. Cheong Alum was finally released and 
banished from Hong Kong on 31 July 1857.  
 
I. 
 
These ‘facts’ of the mass poisoning cannot, however, be dissociated from their context, 
which was alarming and difficult for colonists and Chinese residents alike. As a result of 
increasing pirate attacks on shipping, Chinese holders of Crown leases were given the right to 
record their vessels on a colonial register of shipping, and to sail under the British flag and 
protection. On 8 October 1856 a lorcha, The Arrow, owned and registered by a Chinese 
merchant based in Hong Kong and manned by a Chinese crew, but captained by a British 
citizen, was boarded in Canton.8 The crew were detained on a charge of piracy and smuggling. 
The captain insisted that the British ensign had been removed by the Chinese boarding party, 
whereas the Chinese insisted that the lorcha was not flying a flag. Consequently, it was not a 
British vessel and not entitled to British protection. Harry Parkes, the British Consul at Canton, 
demanded the release of the prisoners and sought redress. The Chinese refused to apologise, 
reiterating their charges against the The Arrow. For Parkes, the general principle was that 
British ships had to be free from Chinese interference as laid down in the supplementary 
clauses of the Treaty of Nanking. Despite the confusing and contradictory claims and counter-
claims, Sir John Bowring, without authorisation from Whitehall, used the incident to re-open 
the question of British access to Canton. When the imperial commissioner for foreign affairs, Ye 
Mingchen,9 did not respond, Bowring sanctioned the bombardment and occupation of Canton 
in October 1856, and the conflict escalated. On 14 December, the Chinese retaliated by setting 
fire to the by then vacant European quarters of Canton, and in early January 1857 by burning 
British mercantile property at Whampoa. A series of attacks on British shipping in the Canton 
delta culminated on 29 December in the murder and decapitation of all eleven of the European 
passengers, including the Spanish vice-consul at Whampoa, on board the postal steamer The 
Thistle.10 The attack was carried out by Chinese soldiers disguised as passengers. This incident 
seemed to confirm the veracity of claims that Ye had issued a proclamation containing a tariff 
of rewards promised to those who succeeded in killing foreigners: 
Whoever catches an English or French rebel chief will receive a reward of 5000 dollars. 
Whoever cuts off the head of a rebel barbarian will receive a reward of 50 dollars. 
Whoever catches a rebel barbarian alive will receive a reward of 100 dollars. Whoever 
catches a traitor, will, on producing satisfactory evidence, receive a reward of 20 dollars. 
Whoever can manage to burn or take a large war steamer will receive a reward of 
10,000 dollars. Whoever can manage to burn or take a shallow water steamer will 
receive 200 dollars, and can be remembered for further reward. 
The proclamation added:  
All those who are in the employ of the foreign dogs must leave their employment in one 
month, and after one month, if they still stay with the foreign dogs, and do not return to 
their native villages, the elders of the villages will hand over their families.11 
Between November 1856 and April 1857 a terror campaign against Hong Kong was 
unleashed by Ye, presumably in an attempt to force the colonists to abandon the no longer 
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quite so barren rock.  Dr. Thomas Boswall Watson, who moved from Macao to Hong Kong in 
1856 and was part-owner of the Hong Kong Dispensary, wrote at the time that it was 
considered a serious possibility that the British might have to give up the colony.12 Local 
newspapers recorded the cutting off of supplies to the colony, pirate attacks on British vessels, 
ordering the Chinese inhabitants to leave the colony (an estimated 5,000 Chinese residents left 
the colony in early 1857 in response to proclamations, which would still have been a relatively 
small percentage of the total of 75,000),13 setting fire to European property, and most 
pertinently, assaulting and killing colonists. A siege mentality was cultivated by newspaper 
reports of the latest audacious Chinese atrocities and rumours of plots, impending arson 
attacks and invasions of the colony. Colonists could not be sure, for example, whether 
hostilities such as the unsuccessful attack on Jardine Matheson’s premises on 26 December, 
were opportunistic criminal acts carried out by pirates, or political acts co-ordinated by a 
Chinese enemy resident in Hong Kong.14 The American merchant Augustine Heard – who was 
however labelled by his brother Albert as ‘of an excitable and nervous temperament’15 – 
described the mood of that time:  
the Winter of 1856-7 was a difficult one to pass. We were at war with China - that is to 
say the English were, and all foreigners were involved. Our servants were ordered to 
leave us and, as their families were on the mainland, in the power of the mandarins, 
they were compelled to obey. They went home by detachments, and two or three were 
usually left in the house. A price was set on our heads, varying with the station of each 
individual.16 
This sense of siege generated increasingly fractious relations among the European 
colonists as well as between the European colonists, the Chinese and the Hong Kong 
authorities.17 During 1856, the colonists repeatedly petitioned Sir John Bowring to tighten 
legislative controls over the Chinese populace. There was particular concern about the 
unregulated influx of lower-class Chinese as a result of turmoil in the mainland. For example, on 
16 October a public meeting of ratepayers protesting about the state of public safety in the 
colony and an ineffective police force, demanded that strict registration be introduced.18 By 
December seventy additional police officers were appointed to increase patrols; H.M.S. Acorn 
was moored off Central Market; a military picket was stationed in the town centre; empty 
houses were being used a temporary barracks; a fire-brigade was established; and European 
residents were sworn in as Special Constables.19 The agitated state was compounded by the 
rumour that on 10 January there would be an attempt to torch Hong Kong. Arson was 
increasingly deemed to be the weapon of choice that the Chinese authorities would deploy 
against Hong Kong. 
There is also evidence of increasing discontent among respectable Chinese residents 
about new forms of discriminatory treatment by the colonial authorities.  On 20 November 
1856 Chinese traders shut up shop and presented a list of grievances to William Caine, the 
Colonial secretary.20 The Chinese were angry about how the police were enforcing the Buildings 
and Nuisances Ordinance No. 8, which was enacted in April 1856 to deal with overcrowded 
unsafe and unsanitary tenements.21 There were also grievances about the over-zealous 
enforcement of Ordinances No.s 11 and 12 of 1856; general police brutality and discrimination; 
and the tighter regulation of public festivities associated with Chinese New Year.22 However, on 
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20 November there was also widespread disorder involving ‘a rabble of idle and vagabond 
population’23 in the centre of Hong Kong. What became known as the ‘Anstey Riots’ resulted in 
the military being deployed to support the police. The government activated Registration 
Ordinance No. 7 of 1846 requiring all un-registered Chinese to leave the colony. R. D. Caldwell 
was also appointed as Registrar General and Protector of the Chinese to work with the 
‘respectable class’ of Chinese to agree an acceptable anti-vagrancy law. On 16 December 1856 
a notice was published, notifying the Chinese inhabitants that they must carry a pass and a 
lantern if on the streets after 10 pm. Emergency legislation in the form of Ordinance No. 2 for 
‘better securing the peace of the colony’ was passed on 6 January 1857, confirming the 
requirement to carry night passes, and giving the authorities general powers of arrest and 
deportation, as well as giving the police the right to ‘shoot to kill’ between the hours of 8pm 
and sunrise.24 
 
II 
 
Alongside the ‘facts’ of the mass poisoning and their localised context, we would argue 
that there are three hypotheses as to why the bread from Cheong Alum’s bakery was poisoned, 
each of which leads to different classifications of the event. The first and dominant hypothesis 
is that it was an audacious China-sponsored attempt to eradicate the colonists, orchestrated 
either by Cheong Alum or someone in his employ, acting on instructions from Ye in Canton. The 
second hypothesis is that the bread poisoning was an opportunistic act devised by one of 
Cheong Alum’s commercial rivals, seeking to exploit the turmoil in Chinese-colonial relations, 
and to frame one of Hong Kong’s most prominent Chinese entrepreneurs for mass murder. This 
positions Cheong Alum not as the guilty party, but as the primary victim of the mass poisoning. 
The third hypothesis is that the inclusion of arsenic in the bread mix was an accident, which was 
transformed into a criminal act by a colonial community in the grip of a conspiratorial 
mentality. 
We would like to examine these hypotheses about the mass poisoning by analysing: 
first, the choice and use of poison, second, Cheong Alum’s character and social position in Hong 
Kong, and third, the denial of the incident in England. Let us start with: why was poison chosen 
as the preferred method, and why was bread chosen as the most suitable vector? Poison is 
known to have been feared in the colony at this date, although it was expected in water rather 
than bread, and guards were placed at certain wells. There had been previous poisoning 
incidents reported in Hong Kong – for example, on 8 July 1848, there was allegedly an attempt 
to poison twenty-five men of the Royal Artillery,25 and the Overland Friend of China reported in 
its ‘daily chronicle of atrocities’, precisely on 15 January 1857, the ‘temporary stupefaction of 
two or three Europeans after eating soup believed to have had poison in it’.26 Arsenic was 
known as the quintessential criminal poison, and white arsenic was the commonest source of 
arsenical poisoning in the nineteenth century.27 It has little taste and no colour, is easily mixed 
with food and is extremely fast-acting, so it makes an ideal poison. In one of its forms, it is 
white and opaque and looks like flour, for which it has been mistaken on occasion with fatal 
results. China is one of the countries that has naturally occurring white arsenic, and arsenic was 
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used in traditional Chinese medicine, so procuring arsenic in Hong Kong would have been a 
simple matter. 
Bread must have been chosen as the vector because of the possibilities for targeting 
that it offered. The Chinese population of Hong Kong at the time was estimated by 
contemporaries at between 65,00028 and 70,000,29 and the non-Chinese at c. 1,000, including 
children.30 These figures are slightly lower than the known recorded figures, which are 
separated in the government returns into ‘whites’, who in 1857 were numbered at 1,411, and 
the ‘coloured population’, who were numbered at 75, 683, making a total of 77,094.31 The 
figures cannot have been precise, as so many Chinese were constantly moving between China 
and Hong Kong. The number of troops in the garrison would have been in addition to this. In a 
‘Memorandum shewing the number of deaths in the garrison of Hong Kong during the year 
1857’, on 31 March 1857 the average troops for the quarter were calculated at 711 ‘Europeans’ 
and 274 ‘natives’.32 These troops are largely absent from letters and descriptions of the event, 
which is slightly surprising. Almost the only mention comes in a letter written on the day itself, 
15 January 1857, by the missionary, Benjamin Hobson: ‘We might all have been dead men. 
Almost every plan to destroy us and our soldiers has been hitherto mercifully frustrated.’33 
Consumers of European-style bread in Hong Kong were overwhelmingly non-Chinese, 
and so poisoning the bread, as opposed to the water, allowed the clear demarcation of 
potential victims along racial lines. Sir John Bowring did not state this explicitly in a letter to his 
son Edgar of 20 January 1857, instead using wealth as his demarcating factor: ‘[the people who 
ate the bread were] people of all nations – women and children – but principally among the 
opulent part of the population’.34 Yet even if a few of the 300-500 people who ate the poisoned 
bread were wealthy Chinese (presumably compradors, like Alum, or merchants), it was 
predominantly the colonists who were the intended, and the real, victims.  
There is scattered and piecemeal evidence about the number and ownership of bakeries 
in Hong Kong. However, it was a potentially profitable enterprise. Not only did the colonists and 
the troops require bread but navies required biscuit, in large quantities, to victual their ships, 
and many bakeries catered to all these demands. Cheong Alum was typical in this respect: in 
addition to supplying bread to the colonists, he was under contract to supply ‘bread to the 
Government at Hong Kong for the use of Her Majesty’s forces’,35 and he also supplied the Navy 
with biscuit, as he clarified in the statement he made in connection with the poisoning.36 He 
owned two establishments in connection with his baking operations: a bakery and shop on 
Queen’s Road near the Hung Shing Temple (seen here in a contemporary drawing sent from 
Hong Kong published in The Illustrated London News [Fig. 2]) and a flour warehouse slightly 
away from the centre, above Wanchai, in the area where St. Francis Street is now.37 In the years 
between 1855 and 1857, at least six other bakers with sizeable bakeries are known to have 
operated in Hong Kong: Harrison De Silva,38 George Duddell,39 Louis Adolfe Dronsart,40 Laong 
Ahoy (described as the ‘commissariat baker’ in the trial records),41 Dorabjee Nowrojee,42 and an 
unnamed Portuguese baker, who had supplanted Cheong Alum as Augustine Heard’s supplier.43 
However, whatever the incidence of bread consumption by the Chinese in the colony, and 
whoever the owners of the businesses making bread, it was the Chinese who were most 
involved in the actual making and selling of bread in Hong Kong. At the end of 1856 there were 
twelve Chinese bakers’ shops in Hong Kong, at the end of 1857 there were eleven, and at the 
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end of 1858 there were fifteen.44 All the workers in Cheong Alum’s bakery were Chinese, which 
would have been the norm.  
As a result, both in terms of targeting the colonists and in terms of choosing a method of 
attack that gave hundreds of Chinese uninterrupted access to the proposed vector, putting 
poison in the bread was a strategically clever act, that succeeded in inducing panic. Cheong 
Alum himself allegedly said that he supplied 400 families with bread which, if true, constituted 
a significant majority of the colonists.45 The fact that only 300-500 people became ill does not 
disprove this, as people ate their breakfasts at different times, and those who ate first, and 
became ill, caused others not to eat. The Hong Kong residents who breakfasted earliest and 
started vomiting earliest were ‘Parsees and Moormen’; ‘labouring under the effects of what 
appeared to be poison’, the most obvious source was the bread, as their servants were fellow 
countrymen rather than Chinese.46 Albert Weatherhead wrote that on the day of the poisoning 
‘sickness and terror reigned supreme over the whole community’.47 Both Heard brothers tell 
separately of how news of this was spread around Hong Kong. Albert wrote: ‘Suddenly their 
equanimity was disturbed by the abrupt entrance of the butler who ... [presented]... a huge 
placard, on which was inscribed in large letters – Caution! The bread is poisoned. Antidote, 
powerful mustard emetic and white of eggs. Harland, Surgeon-General.’48 Augustine, writing 
about this in 1894, remembered his warning thus: ‘It was about half-past 10 when my boy 
handed me ... a “circular” – a half sheet of paper, at the head of which was written in large 
characters ‘The bread is poisoned. Take mustard in warm water; after vomiting freely, eat raw 
eggs’, signed by Dr. Chaldecott, a leading physician of the colony. I recognised the hand’.49 The 
fact that two different doctors sent almost identical messages presupposes that the colony’s 
doctors must have met and worked out emergency measures once they had realised that the 
poison lay in the bread. 
The poisoner must have been inexperienced with arsenic as the reason the poisoning 
failed to kill was that too much arsenic had been added (according to Augustine Heard the knife 
used to cut the bread came out shining),50 and it acted as its own emetic. The bread despatched 
to England was analysed in Woolwich by Frederick Abel, later a famous chemist and war 
explosives expert, who was the chemist to the War Department from 1856.51 He had been sent 
four separate specimens to analyse: a piece of white toast, a loaf of white bread, and two 
loaves of dark coloured bread – each was found to contain arsenic, introduced in the form of 
arsenious acid, or the white arsenic of commerce. The quantity of arsenic differed in each type 
of bread. There was least in the toast, four ounces of which contained about two and a half 
grains, an amount which Abel commented ‘has frequently been known to produce death when 
taken into the system’; the dark loaves had two and a half times as much as the toast, and the 
white loaves 6 times.52 Those who ate least bread – such as Lady Bowring – were most at risk, 
but even the amount in the toast appears to have been too much, and resulted in vomiting 
rather than death. After an interval, three deaths were attributed to the effects of imbibing the 
arsenic: Mr. S. Drinker and Captain Williams of the S.S. Lily in January 1858,53 and Sir John 
Bowring’s wife, Lady Bowring, whose death certificate of 27 September 1858 specified 
‘ulceration of the stomach – long standing atrophy – 4 months certified’.54  
The chemical analyses also showed that only the bread itself was poisoned. According to 
the testimony of Dr. Harland, analyses of the yeast, flour, pastry and scrapings from the table all 
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pointed to an absence of arsenic,55 which therefore must have been added to the final mix just 
as it was about to be baked. Even so, one Chinese account of the poisoning clearly inclines 
towards the ‘accidental’ hypothesis. An old colleague of Cheong Alum wrote a biographical 
sketch of him in 1904, four years after Cheong Alum’s death, that was subsequently included in 
the clan record of the Cheungs: ‘Because he had too many workers, he had no time to check 
minute details. One day, through carelessness, a worker dropped some “odd things” into the 
flour. When the westerners bought and ate the bread, they all felt sick and fainted ... the British 
suspected that he was commanded by the Chinese government to poison the British, and 
prepared to prosecute him. However, because of his truth and honesty, he was soon 
released’.56 A second reference is more ambiguous, but interestingly does not allude to prior 
knowledge of the poisoning, or to any named individual as perpetrator. A letter from Chan Tsz-
tin to his brother Chan Kwei-tsih of January 1857, seized and published in English translation by 
Wade in the Hongkong Government Gazette in June 1857, stated ‘I hear from some of the 
people … who have come back from Victoria, that the English barbarians are in very great 
perplexity ... A flour bakery had poisoned several English devils, and had been closed; upwards 
of 40 people are imprisoned in consequence’.57 Chan Kwei-tsih was the President or Chief of 
the Committee of Hostility in Xin’an, the district on the coast of which Hong Kong is situated, 
and the rather laconic reference appears to indicate that the Xin’an people took no part in the 
poisoning. Chan Tsz-tin had been specially charged with stopping the supplies entering Hong 
Kong, and this series of letters is particularly interesting for providing an alternative version of 
reality to that of the colonists. 
Another important point is raised by an editorial in The Hongkong Register. Most if not 
all successful prosecutions of poisoning in England relied on evidence relating to purchase of 
the poison, as all sales of arsenic by apothecaries of even a single grain were regulated and 
recorded. All those English prosecutions mentioned in the trial were able to use this record. In 
the 1857 poisoning in Hong Kong, on the contrary, ten pounds of arsenic were used, and yet 
because it was so common, there was no chance of finding out who had purchased them and 
where.58 
In March 1857 there may have been a second plot that planned once again to kill the 
colonists by poisoning their bread. At the end of the nineteenth century, the registrar of the 
Supreme Court in Hong Kong, James Norton-Kyshe, reported that a Chinese baker employed by 
George Duddell, who had taken over Alum’s slot as the principal baker in the colony, had been 
overheard telling his fellow workers that he had been offered $2,000 to add a soporific to the 
biscuit dough.59 It is unclear whether this was a rumour, the result of an over-active 
imagination, or had some basis in reality.  
III 
The second point relevant to the hypotheses is the credibility of the accusation that 
Cheong Alum had master-minded the mass poisoning. At the trial,60 the Attorney General 
informed the court that there was no British criminal law that covered the deliberate attempt 
to annihilate a whole community by the ‘secret crime’ of mass poisoning.  Precisely because it 
was a ‘secret crime’, demonstrable proof of association could not be laid before the jury, and 
consequently the prosecution case would have to depend heavily on circumstantial evidence. 
According to the Attorney General, the two primary men accused, Cheong Alum and his father, 
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were not only responsible for their own actions, but for the acts of their servants/employees 
who were their accomplices. The trial record provides an invaluable insight into how the racial 
and class fractures and personal connections that delineated Hong Kong society determined the 
ways in which the poisoning incident would be understood. At no point was the poisoning 
denied. Instead, the jury was asked to adjudicate between very different representations of 
Cheong Alum’s character and his motivational state of mind. Both prosecution and defence 
could agree on the basic facts of Cheong Alum’s life. He had come to Hong Kong from Macao 
when he was eighteen, and became chief comprador61 of Murrow, Stephenson and Co. before 
setting up his own trading company. It is claimed in a biographical note that he was behind the 
idea of running steamers between Hong Kong and Macao. His bakery and bread shop were the 
most important in Hong Kong, famous for using ‘Western methods to produce the finest quality 
goods. Its products supplied all the water and land (residents) of Hong Kong’.62 Almost all the 
leading colonists who knew Cheong Alum or had had dealings with him vouched for his 
trustworthiness and colonial credentials. His place of origin was Xiangshan,63 a part of 
Guangdong province bordering on Macao, and his identity was marked by this, so that his shop 
was apparently known as ‘the Heung Shan Man’s Bread Shop’.64 Many colonists and Chinese 
who knew Cheong Alum adverted to his gravitas and bearing. The American doctor, William 
Maxwell Wood, who was a neighbour of Cheong Alum, in his published memoirs of 1859 
referred to him as ‘my honest friend, the gentlemanly grocer’.65 James Legge, the missionary, 
fifteen years after the poisoning episode, recounted his experience of Cheong Alum whom he 
had encountered when Cheong Alum was a prisoner in the jail: ‘he was a tall, imposing-looking 
man for a Chinese, and had been well-educated. On the Sundays, when I went to conduct a 
religious service with them, he quite took me under his patronage, had the books ready, and 
maintained perfect order among all who attended’.66 Legge’s choice of the phrase ‘under his 
patronage’ is telling here; Legge uses this to signal an abnormal reversal of roles.  
The witnesses provided information about their relationships with Cheong Alum. Mr 
Drinker, of Thomas Hunt and Co had just agreed a large contract with Cheong Alum to provide 
27,000 or 28,000 lbs of biscuit for the Russian Corvette. Because he also sold flour to Cheong 
Alum, he was a frequent visitor to the shop and bakery and was able to identify the roles and 
responsibilities of various defendants. Mr Bridges, Mr Le Mesurier and Mr Dundee confirmed 
that Cheong Alum had signed a large contract with the government for 100,000 lbs of biscuit. 
Mr Speeden, the U.S. government storekeeper, had contracted Cheong Alum on several 
occasions, most recently for 108,000 lbs of biscuit. George Duddell confirmed that he had sold 
the bakery to Cheong Alum and that his European foreman had taught the Chinese staff how to 
make the bread. Most recently, he had sold Cheong Alum two baking machines. Mr Edwards 
and James Stephenson provided an insight into their back-and-forth bartering with Cheong 
Alum over different contracts. Harrison T. De Silver had known Cheong Alum since 1849 and, 
like other traders, had entered into several large contracts for the delivery of bread. De Silver 
had also arranged for Cheong Alum’s purchase of a state-of-the-art kneading machine from 
America.  
Throughout, the prosecution insisted that Cheong Alum was one of two 
personifications. The ‘real’ Cheong Alum was a strategically important, deep-cover agent of the 
Chinese authorities, who had patiently awaited instructions on when and how to launch a 
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cowardly attack the colonists. He was a principal associate of a network of sleeper spies and 
saboteurs.67 Cheong Alum’s high-profile baking business was the perfect cover and site for 
planning and executing a mass poisoning. The jury was asked by the prosecution to deliberate 
on a secondary depiction, hastily drawn from the testimony of certain witnesses, of Cheong 
Alum as a desperate business man who had accrued many debts and who, as a consequence, 
was willing to carry out Chinese instructions in return for sizeable financial recompense. Both 
depictions condemned Cheong Alum as guilty as charged.  
The defence standpoint was that the prosecution’s case was factually inaccurate and 
speculative. The jury was asked to appraise the known facts and to steer clear of 
unsubstantiated rumour and innuendo. The defence used their witnesses to construct a profile 
of Cheong Alum as one of the most integrated, prosperous and well-respected Chinese 
businessmen in Hong Kong.68 His loyalty and allegiance were not in doubt. It would have been 
suicidal for Cheong Alum to participate willingly in an absurdly amateurish poisoning plot that 
was doomed to failure. Cheong Alum was not the enemy within, although he himself had a 
number of enemies who wished to discredit him. He was the victim of a conspiracy, fomented 
either by the Chinese authorities who disapproved of his closeness to colonial interests, or by a 
commercial competitor who was jealous of his near monopoly over governmental and naval 
contracts,69 or by an employee with a personal grudge. Notable in this respect was the 
disappearance of two of Cheong Alum’s employees, who were never apprehended.70  In the 
course of the defence testimony, there are references to the pressure being placed on Cheong 
Alum by various Chinese authorities to stop trading with the colonists, leave Hong Kong and 
return home, in order to prove his loyalty to his homeland; and this pressure was obviously 
causing Cheong Alum considerable difficulty. The fact that his shop had stayed open on the first 
day of the strike in November 1856 had marked him out too conspicuously as a partner of the 
colonists, with a stake in the fledgling Anglo-Chinese colony. The testimony provided by 
competitors, creditors, patrons and employees about Cheong Alum’s businesses placed him at 
the centre of a network of entrepreneurial interactions between him, the colonists, the colonial 
authorities, and other Chinese business interests. On this reading of the trial, it was 
inconceivable that Cheong Alum would have poisoned his own bread. 
This chaotic trial concluded with a sensational verdict of ‘not guilty’. The post-mortem 
into the failure to convict, played out on the pages of the local newspapers, was rancorous in 
the extreme.71 Sir John Bowring and the criminal justice process were blamed for failing to 
protect the interests of the colonists, and signalling to the Chinese that they could conspire 
against the Europeans with impunity. Bowring’s insistence on trial by jury had not only stopped 
Cheong Alum from being lynched as soon as he was apprehended – Albert Heard stated that 
‘the grave law-abiding British merchants were as eager for the blood of this villain as Texan 
Rangers could be to string up a horse thief’72 – but now had led to his acquittal.  That the ‘not 
guilty’ decision fuelled the colonists’ sense of insecurity is shown by memoranda immediately 
submitted to the Governor by representatives of the colonial community, demanding that 
Cheong Alum be expelled immediately from Hong Kong. A more temperate petition, emanating 
from the Chinese community, recommended his expulsion after he had sorted out his affairs to 
the satisfaction of his business associates.73 The Attorney General set about drafting a criminal 
ordinance covering attempts to murder entire communities by poisoning, but what was in 
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effect a conspiracy law was rejected by the Colonial Office as being out of step with English 
legal tradition.74  
IV 
A third issue is the question of the reception of the mass poisoning incident in England. 
Unsurprisingly, Sir John Bowring received support from fellow colonial governors. For example, 
Lord Canning, Governor General of India, wrote an emotional letter to Bowring on 20 February 
1857: ‘I cannot conclude without congratulating you upon your providential escape and that of 
your family from the fiendish attempt at wholesale murder which your last letter describes. I 
see it since reported that the monster who made it has been taken. I hope no laws will stand in 
the way of his being hung as high as Haman’.75 Canning accepts without question that the 
poisoning took place, as he was living in a similarly volatile colonial environment. But reception 
of the poisoning took several forms, matching the divide between those who had lived through 
it, and had evidence of its reality, and those who had not, some of whom tried to deny that it 
had taken place. One form was material, peddled by ‘survivors’ of the poisoning: under their 
aegis, the poisoned bread became a vital piece of evidence and a prized artefact, and pieces of 
it began to take on a life of their own and to circulate around the world. For example, the 
Victorian entertainer Albert Smith visited Hong Kong, Canton and Macao for five and a half 
weeks in 1858 to collect material for his new Chinese show at the Egyptian Hall in London, 
‘Mont Blanc to China’, which opened on 22 December that year, and ran for five months. The 
hall was decorated with Chinese curios and works of art, including the two wooden crosses 
Smith brought back from the execution ground at Canton; 76 a piece of the poisoned bread was 
also most probably on display. Smith was given ‘a bit of the famous “poisoned bread”’ by Dr. 
Kenny, ‘the oldest English practitioner at Hong Kong’, as well as other gifts of shoes for women 
whose feet had been bound, and carved bracelets, presents that Kenny must have considered 
representative of life in the colony and of Chinese culture.77 Dr. Kenny was one of the five 
doctors in Hong Kong, led by Dr. Harland, who had originally analysed various pieces of the 
bread for poison in January 1857,78 and he must have kept at least one piece of the bread as a 
memento of the incident. Another piece of the poisoned bread was kept in a glass-fronted 
cupboard in the office of the clerk of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, at least until 1933. 
Seventy-six years after the event it still preserved its shape and form on account of its arsenic 
content, functioning as an historic piece of evidence and acting as a reminder of how close the 
fledgling British colony came to annihilation.79 
A final, crucial aspect of the reception was that some people in England chose to deny 
that the poisoning incident had ever taken place. English attitudes to the Chinese are shown by 
their insistence on joking about Cheong Alum’s name, which must have contributed to their 
predisposition to cast doubt on the reality of the attempted poisoning. Cheong Alum’s name 
alone occasioned mirth bordering on disbelief in England, as the addition of alum to flour in the 
nineteenth century by both millers and bakers often meant that bread was adulterated twice 
over.80 A baker named Cheong Alum would have been considered funny by itself, but a baker 
named Cheong Alum accused of adding poison to his own dough seemed too good to be true in 
England. One Colonial Office official underlined Cheong Alum’s name in the anguished dispatch 
written by Bowring to William Labouchère on 15 January 1857 describing the poisoning, and 
wrote in the margin: ‘Surely a mythical name’.81 Nor could Punch resist the pun, starting an 
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article on the poisoning in March 1857 with ‘A Chinese baker, prophetically named ALLUM, 
poisoned the bread served out to foreigners at Hong-Kong’.82 The same issue contained the 
words: ‘JOHN CHINAMAN, in poisoning bread for the purpose of serving an ejectment on the 
Europeans, may be regarded by lawyers as having highly entitled himself to be described by the 
soubriquet of JOHN DOUGH’.83 
 Humour notwithstanding, disinformation, misinformation and rumour played a large 
part in the re-telling of colonial life back at home, in part because of the distances involved and 
the time-lag between events in the colonies, and their appraisal in England. Poisonings were 
ideally suited to rumour-mongering, and rumours of what had happened in the 1857 poisoning 
circulated widely (and wildly) across the globe. For instance, news from Paris in February 1857 
reported that the English residents and warehouses at Hong Kong had been burned (this was 
later corrected). And, according to The Illustrated London News, private letters from the 
‘Chinese Seas’, received at Paris in March 1857, state that ‘Alum had been tried before a 
Council of War legally constituted, and convicted of an attempt to poison the English chargé 
d’Affaires and his family. The man was condemned to death and shot, together with 3 of his 
accomplices’.84 The same story was repeated, in an unpleasantly mocking fashion, in Punch on 
28 March 1857, with much added sarcasm and would-be jokes, such as: ‘A subscription has, 
therefore, been entered into to erect a fitting monument at Hong-Kong to the unfortunate 
ALLUM and his hopeless companions. A suitable inscription has been promised by a 
distinguished bishop in the very oiliest English’.85  
But outright denial takes disinformation or misinformation to another level, and signals 
that something important is happening. The first rumours that the Hong Kong poisoning was 
not being believed in England reached the colony quite early on. This denial did not emanate 
from civil servants at the Colonial Office, whose correspondence makes clear that they believed 
in the poisoning, but from MPs and journalists. Weatherhead adverted to English incredulity 
when he wrote: ‘the celebrated poisoning affair ... a most diabolical attempt at the wholesale 
murder of an entire community, I doubt whether history can furnish a parallel instance. So 
unprecedented, and startling was the occurrence that much incredulity was manifested in this 
country [England] at the time as to the reality and it was supposed that at all events the case 
had been greatly exaggerated.’86 However, in some cases incredulity and exaggeration 
hardened into outright denial, as attested by one of The Times correspondents: ‘The news from 
England brought by the mail on the 10th [June 1857] was ... that some comfortable twaddle had 
found out that Alum’s bread was not poisoned ... As to the Alum bread, there is some of it in 
England, and several loaves of it are here. If the individual who, at a safe distance, talks so 
skeptically upon this matter, will eat half a pound of this bread, it will terminate all discussion, 
and set the question at rest in a most satisfactory manner’.87 Hansard reported a debate in the 
Commons of 20 July 1857 in which Lt.-Colonel Thomas Thompson denounced the whole 
episode as a lie: ‘Was there a man who believed in the poisoning at Hong Kong? Call the whole 
College of Physicians, and ask whether they could poison 300 men with arsenic without any of 
them dying, the arsenic not being weighed out by grains and scruples, but put into bread of 
which they ate according to their appetites, some more, some less.’ According to Thompson, 
the poisoning was just one of a line of falsehoods that started with the insistence that the 
British flag had been flying on the Arrow, used to justify the attack on Canton.88 On 18 June 
13 
 
1857 The China Mail reported that questions had been asked in England about the poisoning 
episode. Some queried whether the bread had been poisoned at all, a second group positing 
that the flour was putrid rather than mixed with arsenic, and a third camp suggesting other 
obnoxious ingredients, such as roman cement, lime or chunam.89  
Perhaps in response to this, and with the aim of quelling speculation, a portion of the 
poisoned bread was sent to Professor Justus Liebig in Germany. Arsenic ‘to the extent of 250 
milligrammes was found in every 50 grammes – which is equal to from 38 or 39 grains in a loaf 
of 500 grammes – … and the report of the physicians in China is fully corroborated’.90 Governor 
Bowring wrote to his son Frederick in September 1857 that he had received a letter from J P S 
stating that ‘the story of the poisoning is a lie of mine, which nobody believes’. Finally, 
Augustine Heard commented: ‘I have seen it stated in print, with a view to removing this stain 
from the Chinese, that the poisoning affair was pure fiction evolved from a panic-stricken 
imagination, but there is no doubt whatsoever about the facts which were as I have stated.’91 
There are many ways of downplaying or downgrading an incident that can be effective, but 
denial – although especially aggravating to those who have lived through the incident or had 
their lives affected by it – usually has the opposite effect. So it is worthwhile asking: why was 
the Hong Kong poisoning incident denied by certain influential people in England? We would 
suggest that the very denials were an important part of the attempt to discredit Sir John 
Bowring politically on account of what were seen as his reckless military actions in China. 
However, there is a big difference between denying that the poisoning happened at all, and 
questioning whether it was a deliberate criminal attempt to wipe out a whole community. It is 
easy to see how claims could be made in England that the poisoning had been exaggerated by 
Bowring and his supporters for political capital. What is more interesting is that some English 
commentators categorically stated that the poisoning never took place at all.  
Interpretations have swarmed over the available ‘facts’ concerning the mass poisoning 
of January 1857 in Hong Kong. As far as most colonists were concerned, with Ye on the 
doorstep and a majority Chinese population all around them in Hong Kong, the poisoning was 
simultaneously an act of mass terrorism, a war crime and a criminal conspiracy, and they held 
Cheong Alum responsible for it. Alternative framings of the event, such as commercial sabotage 
or an accident, which would have been a luxury in times of war, surfaced only very occasionally. 
In England, however, half a world away from an unsanctioned war with China, sections of the 
political elite and some journalists preferred to deny the existence of the poisoning, labelling it 
an imagined or imaginary event, even though it had undoubtedly happened. Instead, they 
pinned the blame for whatever trouble there was on the governor, Sir John Bowring, whose 
wife, in a cruel twist of fate, was the only person who definitely died as a result of the 
poisoning. Cheong Alum, the alleged conspirator and mass murderer, in yet another twist, after 
a few years in Macau, lived the rest of his long life in Vietnam as a respected community leader 
and successful businessman, dying only in 1900.92 Equally ironic is what happened to the 
afterlife of how the event was understood. 1857 turned out to be a ‘red year’ of unprecedented 
insurrections across the British empire,93 but the geopolitical conflicts of 1857 simultaneously 
downgraded the affairs of smaller colonies, and relegated the mass poisoning to being a minor 
footnote of only local interest. 
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